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Introduction
The recent global crisis has taught us a number of important lessons. Financial crises are usually followed by severe reductions of the availability of financial services and economic downturns, leading to unemployment. When banks experience financial distress, the government usually comes to rescue, leading to sovereign defaults. Furthermore, problems in the banking sector are also found to be followed by depreciations of the exchange rate and, therefore, are likely to be associated with changes in relative prices. All of these can affect the distribution of welfare between households belonging to different socio-economic groups and workers of different activity sectors. The occurrence of banking, sovereign debt, and currency crises can disproportionately hurt the most vulnerable groups. The data tell us that the occurrence of financial crises was important in recent years (Figure 3 However, countries with higher levels of social spending tend to experience faster reductions poverty headcount and gap (Figures 8 and 9 ).
2 The question addressed in this paper is : to what extent financial crises affect the poor in developing countries and whether social protection can help mitigate this possible detrimental effect of crises ?
In theory, financial crises can affect poverty through an income effect, a distributional effect, and a disruption effect. Regarding the income effect, crises generate income losses through a slowdown in economic activity. Both formal and informal sectors suffer from this income effect owing to jobs losses in the former and a slowdown in demand for services in the latter. As for the distributional effect, financial crises influence income distribution through a fiscal retrenchment and changes in relative prices and the value of assets. A sovereign default crisis, by generating spending cuts, reduces public transfers to most vulnerable people. A currency crisis, by depreciating the domestic currency, can raise the price of tradables relative to nontradables, leading to a fall in earnings in the nontradable sector. In contrast, this increases employment and earnings in the tradable sector due the increased demand for exports (see, for instance, Baldacci et al., 2002) . Currency crises may also affect households by increasing domestic food prices (see, for instance, Shan et al., 1997) . Concerning changes in the value of assets, banking crises affect the wealth 1. These calculations are made using a sample of 40 developing countries over the period 1985 . 2. Following Clements et al. (2011 , we define social spending as public spending on education and Health.
Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 distribution through changes in interest rates. As regard the disruption effect, it refers to the fact that financial crises hurt household income and consumption by reducing the access to financial services (savings, credit, and insurance).
In contrast, protecting the poor from adverse shocks, for example by increasing their access to social assistance, can help mitigate these detrimental effects of crises. Particularly, social safety nets, by focusing on insurance (ex ante), protection (ex post), and poverty alleviation, may help poor households during periods of crisis (see, for instance, Mahendra Dev et al., 2007) .
However, while the occurrence of banking, currency, and sovereign default crises is increasingly important in developing countries, it is still unclear the extent to which they affect poverty and income distribution. This is in part due to the lack of cross-country and time series data on poverty for such countries. Another concern is the role policy interventions can play to mitigate the expected detrimental impact of crises on the poor. Previous research has identified macroeconomic shocks as important determinants of households'
income (see, for instance, Mahendra Dev et al., 2007) but the evidence of the impact of financial crises on poverty in developing countries remains scarce.
This study extends the previous ones, by using a cross-country framework, exploiting the variations in poverty and in the occurrence financial crises across countries and over time, and deepens existing findings, by paying a special attention to the importance of targeted social protection programs in poverty alleviation. We argue that the extent to which financial crises hurt the poor depends on the level of social spending, as a percentage of total government spending. We find that crisis-hit countries tend to experience slower reduction in both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. This impact of financial crises on poverty varies significantly with the level of social spending and suggests a mitigating role of social protection. This mitigating role of social spending appears to be relatively more pronounced for education spending than for health spending as a result of the relative importance of the former in our country sample. In other words, income poverty in developing countries is more sensitive to education spending than to health spending in periods of financial crises. The quantitative implications of these results highlight the potential gains from policy intervention.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a number of stylized facts.
Section 3 provides an empirical investigation of the relationship between the occurrence of financial crises, social spending, and poverty and presents the main results. Poverty can be broadly defined as a pronounced deprivation in people well-being. In monetary terms, poor people are those who do not have enough income or consumption allowing them to meet some minimum leaving standards. The two most commonly used indicators of poverty are the poverty headcount index (H0) and the poverty gap index (H1), derived from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty (Foster et al., 1984) .
The poverty headcount index is defined as the proportion of the population that is poor, while the poverty gap index measures the extent to which individuals fall below the 3. The World Bank's Povcalnet data are available at www.worldbank.org.
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Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 There is a positive partial association between financial crises and poverty. These stylized facts mainly suggest that financial crises may be associated with important increases in both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. Furthermore, the spread of social protection over our sample period indicates that the relationship between crises and poverty might be conditional on the level of social spending. More precisely, this signals a possible important role of social spending in mitigating the devastating impact of crises on poverty.
Empirical Investigation

Sources of variation in poverty
What causes poverty to change over time ? To understand the sources of variation in poverty patterns, we look at their relationship to factors typically discussed in the literature on this issue (see, for instance, Beck et al., 2007; Guillaumont & Kpodar, 2011) : financial crises, social spending, economic growth, demographics, financial development, trade openness, and inflation, the first two being our interest variables. In line with the Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 stylized facts, the central idea in this section is that financial crises increase poverty but social spending can help mitigate this detrimental effect.
As discussed above, financial crises affect poverty through alternative but not mutually exclusive channels : an income effect, a distributional effect, and a disruption effect.
Financial instability and crises can influence households' income through slowdowns in economic activity and loss of jobs, changes in relative prices, and fiscal retrenchment (see, for instance, Baldacci et al., 2002) . Crises can also affect poor through their impact on the returns on physical asset and capital, public transfers as well as community ties (see, for instance, Ferreira et al., 1999) . However, social spending, as an important counter cyclical social policy can help dampen the impact of crises on poverty. For example, social safety nets can stop people falling into poverty and promote their livelihoods. In contrast, poverty is expected to decrease with the level of social protection because it can raise people skills and productivity. Countries with high social spending tend to have a higher participation of poor to economic activity and thereby a better inclusiveness of economic growth. In this study, poverty is measured alternatively by the poverty headcount or the poverty gap. To proxy for financial crises, we consider banking, sovereign debt, and currency crises.
Economic growth can influence the level of poverty in opposite directions. On the one hand, economies with sustained inclusive growth can allow people to contribute to and benefit from economic growth so that they will experience lower levels of inequality and poverty. 7 On the other hand, in countries where growth is non-inclusive growth, most vulnerable people cannot benefit from economic development, potentially leading to increased inequalities and to a positive association between economic growth and poverty.
Regarding demographics, a higher share of the economically inactive dependent population, by decreasing households saving and investment, is likely to increase poverty. This is captured by including both the age dependency ratio and the population growth.
Furthermore, a better developed financial sector can raise the access of poor people to financial services (for example, credit, saving, and insurance) and reduce inequalities between rich and poor. The measure of financial development used below is the ratio of private credit to GDP (see, for instance, Beck et al., 2007; Guillaumont & Kpodar, 2011) . Macroeconomic mismanagements and instability, captured by inflation, can ad-7. Inclusive growth refers to both the pace and distribution of economic growth (see, for instance, Kraay, 2004; Berg & Ostry, 2011; Anand et al., 2013) . 
Estimation Results
Estimating the impact of financial crises on poverty raises a number of questions among which the most important is the endogeneity bias. Although the issue of reverse causality is not likely to be a major concern here, 8 one has to worry about the possibility of omitted variable bias. For example, the same adverse macroeconomic shocks that trigger financial crises may also affect the poor. This may confound our results if such shocks are not taken into account.
To address this, we first use a mixed system of the probability of financial crises and and the poverty impact of crises including fixed effects (Fixed Effects). Then, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM), allowing us to correct for endogeneity for all right-hand side variables. The econometric specification and the identification strategy are provided in the appendix. As shown in Table 6 
Financial Crises, Social Spending and Changes in Poverty Headcount
The regression results from the two estimators -Fixed Effects and the System GMM (Generalized Method of Moments)-are presented in Table 1 . We first present the results of the Fixed Effects model in columns 1-4. Besides, we present the results using the System GMM estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of the financial crisis dummy as well as all right-hand side variables (columns 5-8). The Fixed Effects model fits 8. Indeed, it not likely that the poor are very important in the portfolios of the banks so that an adverse shock on their revenue cannot affect bank balance sheet adversely. In addition, poor people do not have sufficient foreign currency-denominated assets to significantly influence the probability of currency crises. This coefficient suggests an economically substantial effect. On average, crisis-hit countries experience a difference in the growth rate of poverty headcount about eight percentage points higher compared to non-crisis countries. Take We present the results when differentiating between education spending and health spending in the next two left-side columns (columns 3 and 4 and columns 7 and 8, respectively for the Fixed Effects model and the System GMM estimator). It is apparent that both education and health spending help mitigate the detrimental effect of financial crises on poverty. The coefficients the interactions between the crisis dummy and the The age dependency, which is the ratio of population below 15 and above 65 to population between 15 and 65, and inflation are found to exert a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the growth of H0. Interestingly, the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio and its interaction with the indicators of social spending are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, signaling that there is no evidence that the errors in the crisis and the poverty equations are correlated.
Financial Crises, Social Spending and Changes in Poverty Gap
The poverty gap index measures the extent to which the income of individuals falls below the poverty line, as a proportion of the poverty line. Unlike the headcount index of poverty, this index provides the minimum cost of eliminating poverty, if transfers were halshs-00843010, version 1 -10 Jul 2013
Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 perfectly targeted. Table 2 contents results using the poverty headcount as the indicator of poverty. We present the results from the two previous estimators in columns 1-4 and 5-8, respectively. As before, we begin by running the regression without accounting for the interaction between the crisis dummy and social spending (columns 1 and 4). As before, the initial level of H1 enters negatively and significantly, indicating a convergence effect in poverty levels in our country sample. These results suggest that the presence of a financial crisis is associated with slower reductions in the poverty gap. The coefficients on the crisis dummy are positive and statistically significant. Being affected by a financial crisis is associated with 4.7 and 10.6 percentage points increases in the growth of headcount, respectively for the Fixed Effects and System GMM estimators. This corresponds to substantial increases in the minimum cost of eliminating poverty, when regarding the cross-country variation of the poverty gap in the data.
Once again, we include interactions between financial crisis dummies and the measures of social spending to account for the role of social protection in the crisis-poverty nexus.
The coefficients on these interactions are all negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This suggests that social spending importantly reduces the cost of financial crisis on poverty. On average, financial crises have been associated with slower rates of growth in the poverty gap in countries with higher shares of social spending in total government spending. The magnitude of these coefficients indicates an economically substantial effect of social spending in mitigating the negative impact of crises on poverty.
During the period 1985-2009, the average value across countries of social spending went up by about 34 percentage points, which implies there was a four percent reduction in the impact of crises on the poverty gap growth during this period that was associated with social spending.
These mitigating effects of social spending are also economically important when differentiating between education spending and health spending. Once again, the mitigating effect of social spending is relatively more important than that of health spending. The coefficient of -0.576 on the interaction between the crisis dummy and education spending in column 3 suggests that when comparing the poverty gap growth of the country at 75th
percentile (high education spending) with the poverty gap growth of the country at 25th percentile (low education spending), in a crisis we observe a difference of about 10 per-Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 
0.382
Notes : The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of the percentage of the population living on $ 1.25 a day or less, over each three-year period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.
centage points higher, compared to non-crisis periods. 9 Regarding the health spending, the coefficient estimate of -0.259 in column 4 predicts that the poverty gap should grow 2.96 percent slower in the country at the 75th percentile (Nigeria), as compared to the country at the 25th percentile (Nicaragua), in the face of a financial crisis. These differential effects of crises on poverty across countries with varying levels of social spending are substantial when regarding the average growth of 19.5 of the poverty gap over the sample period. Once again, education spending appears to be relatively more important than health spending in mitigating the effect of crises on poverty.
As regard the control variables, the results remain broadly similar to those reported in Table 1 To summarize, the results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that financial crises robustly and importantly hurt both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap but its effect is relatively more pronounced for the former. Interestingly, however, when conditioning the relationship between crises and poverty on the level of social protection, we find that both education spending and health spending help mitigate this detrimental effect of crises.
The mitigating effect of education spending is relatively more pronounced than that of health spending.
9. The country at the 75th percentile of education spending is Thailand, while the country at the 25th percentile is Malaysia.
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Sensitivity to the inclusion of additional controls
In the baseline specification, we use only the conditioning information suggested by earlier empirical studies (see, for instance, Beck et al., 2007) . However, it is possible that other factors generate significant variations in poverty, leading to a potential omitted variables bias. To account for this, we include additional control variables, namely the lagged level of the government balance, the Foreign Direct Investment accounting for the effects of financial openness on poverty, and dummies for PRSP, IMF concessional programs, and twin and triplet crises to take into account the simultaneous occurrence of banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises. Here, a twin crisis is defined as the simultaneous occurrence of banking and currency crises and the triplet crisis is the simultaneous occurrence of banking, currency, and debt crises. 10 The estimated coefficients are presented in Tables   3 and 4 of the appendix, respectively when using the poverty headcount and the poverty gap as the measure of poverty. Overall, the main results remain quantitatively similar to the baseline specification reported in Tables 1 and 2. Consistent with previous findings, government balance are associated with faster reduction in both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. The coefficient on FDI is negative but statistically insignificant, regardless the measure of poverty used. In both regressions, the SSA dummy tends to be positive and statistically significant, confirming the relatively high levels of poverty in this region (Figure 2 ). The coefficient on the PRSP dummy is negative and significant, reflecting the fact that countries under a PRSP experience faster reductions in the poverty headcount and the poverty gap as can be seen in Figure 10 (Appendix). Similarly, the coefficient on the IMF-concessionary program dummy is negative and statistically significant. The twin crises dummy enters positively and significantly, indicating the exacerbating effect of crises on poverty when banking and currency crises occur simultaneously. On average, the dummy of triplet crises, which are relatively less frequent than twin crises, is positive but statistically insignificant. The coefficients on the first set of control variables are not shown but remain also broadly similar to our previous findings.
10. The other cases, namely the simultaneous occurrence of banking and debt, and currency and debt crises appear to be quite rare in our sample.
Implications for Policy
The results reported earlier can help inform the design of policy responses to reduce vulnerability and protect households again adverse shocks during financial crises. On the one hand, crises are significantly associated with faster increases in poverty. On the hand, social protection, captured by education spending and health spending, help mitigate this detrimental effect of crises on poverty. To mitigate the income, distributional, and disruption effects in the short term, policy should focus on macroeconomic stabilization measures at the least cost to poor households.
Fiscal policy. First, fiscal policy should address both macro-level and micro-level issues to limit changes in factors that increase poverty. The implementation of credible fiscal plans is needed to reduce uncertainties and give confidence to the market, while preserving provision of social services. In countries with room for fiscal policy maneuvering, the available fiscal space could be used to support an expansion of social spending and foster inclusive growth. Education spending (for example, expenditures on primary schools) and health spending (for example, the provision of health care) help increase human capital and labor productivity of the poor.
Particularly, the provision of social safety nets, by mitigating the distributional effect, could be the main short term pro-poor direct public action in the face of crises. The set up of these safety nets should focus on providing effective assistance to the most vulnerable households using for example conditional cash transfers. The models of the Bangladeshi food-for-education, the Brazilian Bolsa Familia, and the Mexican Oportunidades programs serve as examples. In the medium term, a fiscal stimulus can be oriented to labor-intensive programs such as rural employment programs to protect the poor from large shocks. One other point is protecting the consumption of the poor through adequate mechanisms to stabilize food prices and provide food subsidies.
Countries with high debt ratios would benefit from pursuing fiscal adjustment steadfastly. Fiscal adjustment in the context of a crisis can hurt the poor disproportionately, although pursuing unbalanced policies is not sustainable. In such countries, gradual and pro-poor adjustments guided by structural targets are needed to rebuild fiscal buffers. The focus should be put on spending lines cuts that can be done to preserve pro-poor spending, for example by reducing or delaying spending that is typically beneficial to the non-poor.
The structure of public tax may also be designed to temporary protect the consumption Etudes et Documents n o 11, CERDI, 2013 of the poor, for example by reducing consumption tax on commodities consumed by the poor.
Monetary and financial policies. In times of banking or sovereign default crises, the financial system needs to be rebooted and put on a safer path. An accommodative monetary policy is needed. The results point to a positive and significant association between inflation and the poverty gap. Monetary policy should therefore be designed to avoid high inflation, since the poor mostly rely on fixed incomes. Policy responses that help clean-up and recapitalize the banking sector remain the short-term priorities to foster the access to financial services, especially for the poor. The development of financial sector can help create financial buffers and boost micro-finance and help most vulnerable people to smooth consumption and rebuild assets during and after crises.
Exchange rate policy. In the face of currency crises, exchange rate policy can be used to influence relative price changes in a pro-poor way. For example, a real devaluation leads to increases in the prices of tradable goods relative to those of nontradable goods.
This can be beneficial to the poor who are net suppliers of tradable goods or who work in tradable sectors. However, devaluations may disproportionately affect the poor if they are associated with increases in food prices.
Structural reforms. The policy measures outlined above are about actions to be implemented when crises have started or during the recovery. But the key challenge ahead is what should be done in non-crisis periods to mitigate the effects of future crises or when preparing for crises. Here, the appropriate policy intervention is to design long term institutional structures for preventing future crises and reducing and managing the risks facing by most vulnerable households. The challenge is threefold. First, the immediate implication of the devastating impact of financial crises on the poor is to put in place policy packages that help prevent future crises. 11 In this regard, it is important to build up better financial systems through further regulation and supervision at the national level. At the regional and international levels, the Basel III agenda can help create better capital and liquidity buffers.
Second, the structure of social safety nets may focus on providing insurance against the risk of income loss before the crisis, without creating longer-term distortions. In practice, this could consist in providing insurance to households with severe working capital constraints, for example by putting in place capital guarantee funds. Our findings also Third, the focus should be on pro-poor structural reforms to regain competitiveness and growth, while gauging the relative impact on different groups. Our results suggest that trade openness and financial openness are good for the poor, although the effect of the latter captured by foreign direct investment (FDI) is mostly insignificant. Trade liberalization should be strengthened while implementing pro-poor actions, especially in services, agriculture, and informal sectors where the poor are more concentrated. For example, taxes or supports for important food staples or agricultural inputs could help increase the income of the poor and improve the availability of products they consume.
In addition, conversion of non-tariff barriers -for reasons other than for health, safety and the environment-to tariff barriers is needed. This can be more beneficial for the poor than for the non-poor since license recipients, who are mostly non-poor, usually collect rents. Regarding financial openness, the key pro-poor policy response is to improve domestic capacity to better exploit foreign investment, for example by building up the infrastructure and the quality of labor force, by increasing investment in human capital in labor-intensive sectors and regions. Furthermore, the labor market reform, by reducing acquired rights of formal sector workers to improve informal workers labor prospects, can help the poor.
However, policymakers should be aware of the difficulties of implementing certain actions, for example, owing to weak information, political pressures to preserves fiscal support to the non-poor, and institutional rigidities.
Conclusion
This study sets out with the aim of assessing the implications of the recently frequent financial crises for poverty reduction using data on 40 developing countries over the period (1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008) . Variable definitions and sources are described in detail in Table 5 .
Econometric model and identification issues
We estimate variants the following econometric model for the two measures of poverty :
where P it represents the indicator of poverty for country i in period t. Crisis iT refers to a dummy variable taking 1 if the country i experiences a financial crisis during the period T . P rotection is either social spending, education spending or health spending, as a percentage of total government spending. X is a set of conditioning information to control for other factors associated with poverty. The explanatory variables are measured either as an average over the period T or as an initial value. ν i , λ T , and u it are country fixed effects, time fixed effects, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively. ν i and λ T allow accounting for fixed effects common across countries and for business cycle effects, respectively.
The main variable of interest is the interaction between the financial crisis dummy and the indicator of social protection (Crisis iT × P rotection iT ). The coefficient on this interaction term estimates the differential effect of financial crises on the growth rate of poverty across countries with varying levels of social spending. In other words, the term β 1 + β 2 × P rotection iT captures the crisis-driven change in poverty growth for different levels of social spending. We expect that countries may have slower increases in poverty in the face of a financial crisis when they experience higher levels of social spending, namely β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0. The initial level of poverty (P i(t−3) ) is included to control for a possible convergence among countries in poverty. CERDI, 2013 In estimating this baseline specification (equation 1), it is clear that the most immediate concern is the endogeneity arising from the selection problem. Indeed, crisis-hit countries can differ systematically from other non-crisis countries, suggesting that the formers are not randomly selected in such a case. They can be adversely selected because of their relatively poor economic performance increase the occurrence of financial crises. The implication of this problem is that simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will be biased.
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We use two estimation methods, namely the Fixed Effects and the System GMM estimators. For the Fixed Effects estimator, the selection bias is controlled for by estimating a mixed system of both continuous and discrete dependent variable. In doing so, we properly isolate the part of the variation in the occurrence of financial crises that is not associated with reverse causation or omitted variables (see, for instance, Vella & Verbeek, 1999; Keen & Lockwood, 2010) . This procedure consists of estimating the impact of endogenous treatment effects. Here, the occurrence of crises is supposed to be a treatment that is driven by a number of factors. Regarding the System GMM estimator, the lagged values of regressors (in levels and in differences) are used as instruments for right-hand-side variables.
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